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ABANDONING THE COMPELLING INTEREST




The First Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the
right of free exercise of religion.' To ensure protection of this right, the
Supreme Court of the United States has adopted a strict scrutiny standard of
review in free exercise cases.2 The Court has summarized this free exercise
doctrine in various forms,3 but has most commonly held that the state must
have a "compelling interest" in order to impinge upon an individual's right
to freely exercise his religious beliefs and practices.4
Free exercise cases under the First Amendment generally involve two pos-
sible situations: a plaintiff either challenges the constitutionality of a law
which directly regulates religious activity, or he seeks exemption from a neu-
tral law of general applicability solely because it impinges upon his practice
of religion.5 States, mindful of the First Amendment guarantee of free exer-
cise, seldom draft legislation directly regulating religion.6 Accordingly,
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). In 1940, the Supreme
Court applied this First Amendment guarantee to states as well as to Congress through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940).
2. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (stating the test to be "whether some
compelling state interest... justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amend-
ment right").
3. The Court has used several variations of strict review. In Thomas v. Review Bd. of the
Indiana Empl Sec. Div., the Court found that the state's burden on religion must be the "least
restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest." 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (em-
phasis added). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court found that "only those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion." 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (emphasis added). Finally, in United States v. Lee, the
Court held that a state may restrict religion only if it can show that such restriction is "essen-
tial to accomplish an overriding governmental interest." 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (empha-
sis added).
4. See generally, Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 686 (1989); Thomas, 450
U.S. at 718; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
5. William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 358 (1989-90).
6. Id. at 357. The Court generally invalidates laws which directly target religion. For
example, in Torcaso v. Watkins, the plaintiff, who was seeking public office, refused to declare
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most free exercise cases involve plaintiffs seeking exemption from secular
laws of general applicability because of their religious convictions.7 Before
the Court will grant these plaintiffs a religious exemption, however, the
plaintiffs must show that they hold a sincere religious belief which is being
burdened by the governmental regulation.8 Once the plaintiffs demonstrate
that they hold a sincere religious belief, the Court will exempt them from the
legislation unless the government can prove both that the law is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that the law is the "least restrictive
means" available to achieve that objective. 9
For the last twenty-eight years,'° the Court has applied this strict scrutiny
standard of review in free exercise exemption cases." Recently, however,
the Court departed from this strict scrutiny standard of review. In Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 2 the Court an-
nounced that the compelling state interest test in free exercise exemption
cases is no longer appropriate and that the Free Exercise Clause does not
apply to laws of general applicability.'
3
In Smith, the Court addressed whether the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment requires the State of Oregon to grant a Native American
Indian a religious exemption from the state's drug laws. 14 Under Oregon
his belief in God as the state constitution required. 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961). As a result, he
was refused a commission to serve as Notary Public. When he brought suit challenging the
law, the Supreme Court declared the Maryland test for public office to be unconstitional, find-
ing it violated the plaintiff's religious freedom. Id. at 496.
7. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (deciding that an Amish couple
could be exempt from Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law, which required parents to
send their children to school until age 16, because the Amish religion forbids children to attend
high school and instead favors educating children at home); Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(ruling that a Seventh-Day Adventist should be exempt from a neutral and generally applica-
ble unemployment compensation law that had the effect of forcing her to choose between her
religious tenets that forbade Saturday work and her eligibility for unemployment benefits).
8. The Supreme Court has recognized that determining whether a belief or practice is
religious is a difficult task, but it offers the following guidance: "[R]eligious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection." Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
The role of the reviewing court is merely to determine if the plaintiff had an "honest convic-
tion" that his religion would forbid the conduct in question. Id. at 716.
9. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1416-17 (1990).
10. Since the 1963 landmark decision in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398, the Court has applied
the strict scrutiny standard.
11. There have been some exceptions to the Court's application of the strict standard of
review, and these exceptions will be addressed in the course of this Note. See infra text accom-
panying notes 210-56.
12. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
13. Id. at 1603.
14. Id. at 1597.
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law, it is a Class B felony to knowingly possess peyote. 5 Two employees of
a drug rehabilitation center consumed peyote during a religious ceremony of
the Native American Indian Church; subsequently, the drug rehabilitation
center fired them.' 6 The State of Oregon Employment Division (Employ-
ment Division) denied them unemployment benefits, finding that they were
fired from their jobs for "work-related misconduct."' 7 The Oregon Court of
Appeals reversed the Employment Division's determination, claiming such
denial of benefits violated the respondents's free exercise rights."8
The Employment Division argued on appeal to the Oregon Supreme
Court that it was justified in denying the benefits to the claimants because
consumption of peyote was a crime under Oregon law.' 9 Relying on United
States Supreme Court precedent,2 0 the Oregon Supreme Court rejected this
argument and concluded that the claimants were entitled to payment of un-
employment benefits.2 According to the Oregon Supreme Court, the crimi-
nality of peyote use was irrelevant to the free exercise claim. The purpose of
the "misconduct" provision was to preserve the financial integrity of the
compensation fund rather than to enforce the state's criminal laws.2 2 The
Oregon Supreme Court then determined that the state's interest was inade-
quate to justify the burden imposed on the plaintiffs's religious practice.2 3
The Supreme Court, on its first review of the case in 1987, agreed with the
Employment Division that the criminality of peyote use was relevant in de-
15. OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987) prohibits "the knowing or intentional possession
of a 'controlled substance' unless the substance has been prescribed by a medical practitioner."
OR. REv. STAT. § 475.005(6) defines "controlled substance" as a drug classified in Substances
Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812 (1982 ed. and Supp. V), as modified by the State Board of Phar-
macy. As compiled by the State Board of Pharmacy under such statutory authority, peyote is
a Schedule I drug. OR. REV. STAT. § 475. 992(4)(a) provides that anyone who possesses a
Schedule I substance is guilty of a Class B felony.
16. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597.
17. Id. at 1598. The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that violation of a
state's criminal laws could constitute "misconduct" as defined by the Unemployment Compen-
sation Statute. Id. According to the Supreme Court, a state may validly deny benefits to
persons whose unemployment resulted from violation of state criminal laws, so long as the
state criminal laws did not violate the First Amendment. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The Oregon Supreme Court cited Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In both of these
cases, the Supreme Court applied the compelling state interest test and determined that denial
of benefits would violate the claimants's right to free exercise of religion. See Thomas, 450
U.S. at 718; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
21. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1598 (citing Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Re-
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termining whether the free exercise rights of the claimants had been vio-
lated.24 The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, had not yet determined
whether sacramental use of peyote was criminal or not. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. 25
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court found that there was no explicit
exemption in the Oregon statute for sacramental use of peyote; therefore,
such use was prohibited.26 As a result, the Oregon Supreme Court deter-
mined that the statute was invalid under the Free Exercise Clause.27 The
Oregon Supreme Court then reaffirmed its previous decision that the State of
Oregon could not deny unemployment benefits to the claimants because of
their religious practice.28
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Scalia,29 reversed the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court.30 The Court
held that the Employment Division's denial of benefits for the illegal use of a
drug was valid.3' According to the majority, the Free Exercise Clause pro-
tects individuals from laws that interfere with religious beliefs but does not
protect individuals from neutral laws of general applicability which affect
religious practices.3 2 In addition, the majority announced that the compel-
ling interest test was no longer appropriate in free exercise cases involving
generally applicable laws.33
Four Justices emphatically disagreed with the majority rationale.34 Jus-
tices Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan dissented from the judgment 35 and
Justice O'Connor, although concurring in the judgment, disagreed with the
majority's reasoning.36 Even though these four Justices reasoned differently
in the Smith case,37 they did agree that the Free Exercise Clause applies to
laws of general applicability as well as to laws which directly target reli-
24. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 (1988).
25. Smith, 110 S. Ct at 1598.
26. Id. (citing Smith, 301 Or. 209, 217-19, 763 P.2d 445, 449-50 (1986)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rhenquist and Justices White, Stevens, and
Kennedy. Justice O'connor concurred in the judgment only, and Justices Marshall, Brennan,
and Blackmun dissented. Id. at 1597.
30. Id. at 1606.
31. Id
32. Id. at 1600.
33. Id. at 1603.
34. Id. at 1606.
35. Id. at 1615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. Justice O'Connor, applying the compelling interest. test, concluded that the Employ-
ment Division's denial of benefits to Smith and Black was valid under the Free Exercise
Clause. Id. Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan also applied the compelling interest
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gion." Also, the concurring opinion announced that "the First Amend-
ment does not distinguish between religious belief and religious conduct,"
39
and it favored the compelling interest test as the standard of review in free
exercise cases." In fact, Justice O'Connor chided the majority for disre-
garding the Court's consistent application of the compelling interest test in
cases involving generally applicable laws which impinge upon religious
conduct.4 1
This Note examines the Smith decision in light of the legislative history of
the Free Exercise Clause, as well as Supreme Court precedents. First, this
Note traces the historical development of the Free Exercise Clause. Next,
this Note looks at Supreme Court holdings in free exercise cases and ana-
lyzes the Court's reasoning for such holdings. This Note focuses on the
development of the belief-conduct distinction under the Free Exercise Clause
and the doctrine of religious exemptions, demonstrating that the Supreme
Court has invoked a strict standard of review in free exercise cases to both
grant and deny religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. This
Note then analyzes the Smith decision in terms of its impact on the belief-
conduct distinction and the modem free exercise exemption doctrine. This
Note concludes that the Smith approach contradicts the purpose and intent
of the Free Exercise Clause and abrogates the protection previously afforded
individuals when exercising their religious beliefs.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FREE EXERCISE
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the Constitution were
proposed in 1789 and ratified in 1791.42 Religious freedom, however, had
been a primary concern of the American people long before these dates.
A. Early Colonial America
The Church of England was the official church in England during the
seventeenth century. Having no tolerance for any other religions,4 3 Parlia-
ment guaranteed free exercise of religion to Anglicans but restricted the
rights of Catholics and Protestant dissenters." In fact, only Anglicans could
test, but concluded that the denial of benefits to Smith and Black violated the Free Exercise
Clause. Id. at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1610
41. Id. at 1607.
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hold public and military offices and those who refused to comply with tradi-
tional Protestantism were imprisoned.45 This lack of tolerance for any reli-
gion other than the Church of England caused turmoil throughout
England.46 Disturbed by the religious persecution in England, and in search
of religious freedom, religious dissenters eventually left England for
America.47
When the settlers moved to the New World and began settling in colonies,
four different approaches to religion emerged: New Englanders established
churches of the Congregationalist-persuasion;4" Virginians kept the Church
of England as their church;49 New Yorkers and those who settled in New
Jersey practiced Protestantism but remained tolerant of other religions;5° the
dissenters established their own separate colonies up and down the east
coast.5 It was the dissenter colony in Maryland that in 1649 articulated the
doctrine of free exercise of religion for the first time. In an effort to foster
religious toleration, the Maryland assembly passed a statute stating: "'noe
person ... professing to believe in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth bee
any waies troubled ... for ... his or her religion nor in the free exercise
thereof.., nor any way [be] compelled to the beliefe or exercise of any other
45. Id.
46. Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1559, 1564 (1989).
47. Id.
48. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1422. These Congregationalists consisted generally of the
English Calvinists called "Puritans" who did not tolerate any other religion. The Congrega-
tionalist ministers had great autonomy and were not accountable to the civil authorities. In
fact, the ministers frequently lectured the authorities on their responsibilities.
49. Id. at 1423. Unlike the Congregationalists, there was no autonomy for the Church of
England. By order of the Crown, the government financed, maintained, and controlled the
Church. Just like the Congregationalists in New England, however, the Virginia colony was
not at all tolerant of other religions. The governing authorities jailed and whipped the Bap-
tists, prevented the Presbyterians from preaching, and expelled the Protestant dissenters and
Catholics. Eventually, the Virginia religious system spread to Georgia, Maryland, and other
southern colonies.
50. Id at 1424. Because of the large, diverse population that settled in the area, people
were very tolerant of religions different from their own. For the most part, only Protestants
worshipped in these two colonies. Neither Quakers nor Jews, however, were disturbed for
practicing their religions.
51. Id. at 1424-25. The dissenters specifically established four colonies for themselves,
each with a different religious sect: English Catholics founded a colony in Maryland, Protes-
tant dissenters founded a colony in Rhode Island, Quakers founded Pennsylvania and Dela-
ware colonies, and proprietors who followed enlightenment principles of toleration founded a
colony in Carolina. Even though a particular religious sect dominated each of these colonies,
they all welcomed religious groups other than their own.
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Religion against his or her consent.' ,52 Other colonies followed suit. In
1663, for example, Rhode Island promulgated a religious freedom provision
using the language "liberty of conscience" rather than "free exercise."
'5 3
Many of the other colonies adopted statutes similar to the Rhode Island
Charter.54 The Rhode Island provision of "liberty of conscience" eventually
emerged as the most common form of protection for free exercise of religion
in the early colonies."
B. Pre-Revolutionary America and the Influence of John Locke
The flagrant support for religious freedom in the early colonial days con-
tinued throughout American history.56 In pre-revolutionary America, many
great political thinkers of the period provided input on the subject of reli-
gious freedom.57 One well-known English writer, John Locke, became a
great contributor to the development of American religious freedom.5"
Locke's ideas on religion became the source for Thomas Jefferson's Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom, which became the major precursor for the
First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.59
52. Id. at 1425 (omissions in original) (quoting Act Concerning Religion of 1649, re-
printed in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 49, 50 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.
1987)).
53. Id.
54. Carolina and New Jersey used language almost identical to Rhode Island's Charter.
Id. at 1427.
55. Id. Regardless of the exact language used, all of the free exercise provisions in exist-
ence during the colonial period had three common features. First, the free exercise provisions
superseded any other laws, practices, or customs of England to the contrary. Second, free
exercise extended to all religious matters, not just to "opinion, speech and profession, or acts of
worship." Id. Finally, freedom of religion was not limited by generally-applicable laws. In
fact, free exercise of religion could only be limited if necessary for the public good. These
features emphasize the importance of religious freedom to the early colonists.
56. In the mid-eighteenth century, an aggressive group of Virginia Presbyterians, Baptists,
and deists pressed the courts for religious equality and petitioned the legislature to repeal all
laws which mandated conformance to a particular religion. They sought toleration for all
religions. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 46, at 1572-73.
57. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1430. While the controversy in America centered on free
exercise, there was also a controversial theoretical debate in England regarding the proper
relation between religion and state. Many of England's greatest thinkers, such as Hobbes,
Bodin, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Bayle, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Smith, and Burke discussed the
subject in some manner. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1430-31.
1991]
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Locke advocated religious tolerance.' ° He believed religious intolerance
could disrupt public peace and good government.6 He opposed interference
with the free exercise of religion, but supported the general idea of separa-
tion of church and state.62 In addition, Locke rejected the doctrine of reli-
gious exemptions from generally applicable laws.63 Locke believed there
was no need to grant exemptions from generally applicable laws on account
of individual religious convictions. According to Locke's theory, if govern-
mental officials faithfully performed their duties and kept the boundaries be-
tween state and religion, then government would seldom intrude upon an
individual's religious freedom." Locke proposed that if a conflict should
arise between an individual's conscience and a generally applicable law, then
that individual should disobey the law and accept the punishment. 65 Thus,
the government always prevailed over individual conscience under Locke's
views.66
C. In the Wake of the American Revolution: The Expansion of
Religious Liberty
Even though John Locke's views were indispensable to the framing of the
Free Exercise Clause, the Framers of state constitutions and the Federal
Constitution supported a more expansive notion of religious freedom than
was inherent in Locke's ideas.6 The United States had moved beyond
Locke's England and the "mere toleration of religion. ' 6' From the perspec-
tive of revolutionary America, Locke's religious views were too limited.69
60. Id. at 1431. "It is not the diversity of opinions, which cannot be avoided; but the
refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions, which might have been granted,
that has produced all the bustles and wars, that have been in the Christian world, upon ac-
count of religion." Id at 1432 (quoting John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 6
WORKS OF LOCKE (London 1823 and 1963 photo. reprint)).
61. Id at 1431.
62. Id. at 1433.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1433-34.
65. Id. at 1434.
66. Id. at 1435.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1444. George Washington stated: "'It is now no more that toleration is spoken
of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of
their inherent natural rights.'" Id. (quoting 31 GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 93 n.65 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939)).
69. Id. Once America survived the revolutionary war, a new political theory evolved:
government by popular consent. Under this theory, the people themselves became the sover-
eign. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 46, at 1568. By means of a written constitution, the
people set forth the independent powers of the legislature, executive, and judiciary. The people
empowered independent judges with the responsibility of determining the scope of individual
religious liberty. Instead of leaving religious accommodation to the legislature, the people
[Vol. 40:929
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America embraced a broader view of religious freedom, one which favored
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.7"
The increasing support for expansion of religious freedom within the
newly formed American states had a significant impact on the Framers of
the Free Exercise Clause.71 Jefferson and Madison were two key players in
the formulation of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, but each
took entirely different stances with regard to religious liberty.72 Jefferson's
idea of religious freedom was, in some respects, similar to the narrow view of
religious freedom advocated by Locke.73 Jefferson believed, in accordance
with Lockean doctrine, in religious tolerance.74 Government should intrude
into religious liberty only to the extent necessary to protect individuals from
injury.75 Like Locke, Jefferson rejected the concept of religious exemptions
from generally applicable laws.7 6 But Jefferson even went further than
Locke by arguing for a belief-action distinction.7 7 Jefferson argued that a
free exercise clause should protect religious beliefs from governmental con-
trol, but not religious conduct. 78 He therefore favored an even narrower
view of religious freedom than Locke.79
Madison was more sympathetic to religion than was Jefferson. ° Unlike
Jefferson, Madison believed in exemptions from generally applicable laws."'
Madison believed that the demands of religion, and not the interests of soci-
ety, should define the jurisdictional division between religion and state:
vested the courts with a power that had previously only been available to the legislature: the
power to make free exercise exemptions. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1445.
70. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1435.
71. Id at 1449.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1450-51.
75. Id. at 1451.
76. Under the Jeffersonian-Lockean view, if an individual's conscience was in conflict
with a general law of the state, the individual should disobey the law and accept the punish-
ment. Government would always prevail. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
77. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1451.
78. Id. Jefferson wrote in a letter that "'the legislative powers of government reach ac-
tions only, and not opinions .... [M]an ... has no natural right in opposition to his social
duties." Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist
Association (Jan. 1, 1820), in 16 THE WRMNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281, 281-82 (A.
Lipscomb ed. 1903)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1452. Jefferson thought religious freedom meant freedom from sectarian reli-
gion, while Madison believed religious freedom encompassed the freedom to practice religion
in any manner desired. Id. at 1453.
81. Id.
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"[I]n matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of
Civil Society." 2
Although both Madison and Jefferson were the key players in the enact-
ment of the religion clauses, history demonstrates that the Free Exercise
Clause ultimately embraced Madison's views."3 After the Revolution, al-
most all of the newly formed American states adopted new constitutions, 4
and every state except Connecticut included a provision protecting religious
freedom. 5
Two particular elements of the newly adopted religious clauses are worthy
to note. First, each of the state constitutions defined the scope of religious
liberty as encompassing both religious beliefs and religious actions.8 6 None
of the provisions confined the protection to only beliefs and opinions, as Jef-
ferson advocated. 7 Second, the free exercise provisions imposed a limita-
tion on religious freedom. The free exercise of religion could only exist to
the extent that such freedom did not disturb the peace, safety, and good
order of the state.88 In the states, therefore, religious freedom included the
protection of actions as well as beliefs.8 9 In addition, free exercise contem-
plated religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.'
82. Id. (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 184 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)). Although
Madison did not specifically articulate a belief in religious exemptions, his writings suggest
that he favored free exercise exemptions. Id.
83. Id. at 1455. Commentators consider Madsion to be the "chief architect of the Consti-
tution and prime drafter of the Bill of Rights." Adams & Emmerich, supra note 46, at 1586.
84. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1455. In fact, between 1776 and 1780, 11 of the 13 states,
plus Vermont, adopted new constitutions. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1458-59.
87. Id. at 1459. Some states, however, did limit the protection afforded religious actions
to conduct involving only acts of worship.
88. Id. at 1461-62. Each of the states used different language in articulating this limit on
free exercise of religion, but the substance of the provisions was similar. For example, nine
states (New York, New Hampshire, Georgia, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, and South Carolina) limited free exercise to actions that would not dis-
turb the "peace" or "safety" of the state. Id. at 1461 n.257. Four states (New York, Mary-
land, Rhode Island, and South Carolina) forbade acts of immorality. Id. at 1461 n.258. Two
states (New Hampshire and Massachusetts) forbade actions which would infringe on the reli-
gious practices of others. Id. at 1462 n.259. Rhode Island prohibited religious actions which
would result in injury to others. Id. at 1462 n.260. Maryland forbade acts contrary to "good
order." Id. at 1462 n.261. Finally, Delaware prohibited religious actions "contrary to the
'happiness,' as well as the peace and safety, of society." Id. at 1462 n.262.
89. If the free exercise of religion was not to encompass conduct, the two provisions
would be unnecessary. "Beliefs without more do not have the capacity to disturb the public
peace and safety." Id. at 1462.
90. The state provisions make sense only if religious liberty includes the right of exemp-
tion from generally applicable laws. This is because the provisions take effect only when a
[Vol. 40:929
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D. Free Exercise Included in the Federal Constitution
The advocates of free exercise at the state level also supported adoption of
free exercise clauses in the Federal Constitution.9 1 The Federalists,9 2 how-
ever, opposed adoption of a federal Free Exercise Clause.93 They argued
that a specific Free Exercise Clause was unnecessary because the new Con-
stitution did not empower the government to pass laws affecting religion.94
According to the Federalists, the checks and balances inherent in the new
structure of the government afforded adequate protection against religious
suppression.9 5 They argued that in a nation filled with numerous religious
groups, it would be difficult for one religious group to impose its beliefs on
the others.9 6 The Federalists's assurances, however, failed to relieve the con-
cerns of the American religious groups. These religious groups did not
worry about one religious group imposing its beliefs on the others, but in-
stead feared that the minority religions would be vulnerable to unintended
effects of legislation.97 Accordingly, the religious groups favored adoption of
the Bill of Rights.9" Many of the states, as well as Madison himself, drafted
proposals of the First Amendment to the Bill of Rights. 99 Several of the
proposals for free exercise clauses used the language "liberty of conscience"
from the early colonial days rather than the phrase "free exercise." ' 0° Ulti-
mately, however, the House of Representatives and the Senate rejected the
language "liberty of conscience" and adopted the "free exercise," language
person engages in religious conduct which violates a generally applicable law. Then the state
can restrict such a person's free exercise of religion as necessary to maintain peace, public
safety, and good order. Thus, the Free Exercise Clause would exempt individuals from gener-
ally applicable laws up to the point that their religious conduct violated the peace, good order,
and safety of the public. Id.
91. Id. at 1440.
92. The Federalists were the supporters of the new Federal Constitution. Id. at 1475.
93. Id. The Federalists argued that the express delineation of individual rights in the
Constitution could preclude the existence of other rights meant to be protected by the Consti-
tution. Id. at 1475-76.
94. Id. at 1477.
95. Id. at 1479. Madison himself was originally in harmony with the Federalists, oppos-
ing the addition of a Free Exercise Clause to the Constitution. As a candidate for Congress,
however, Madison discovered that his constituents favored the Free Exercise Clause and, fear-
ful of losing the election, Madison began to champion a constitutional provision for religious
liberty. Id. at 1476-77.
96. Id. at 1480.
97. Religious sects, such as the Quakers, worried that the legislators would pass general
laws which would have the effect of burdening the religious practices of minority religions. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1481.
100. Id. at 1480-82.
1991]
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of the First Amendment as we know it today.1 'O The use of the phrase "free
exercise," in lieu of "liberty of conscience," supports the idea that the Free
Exercise Clause protects religious actions as well as religious beliefs. ' 2
II. SUPREME COURT DISTINGUISHES BELIEFS FROM ACTIONS
A recurring theme in free exercise jurisprudence revolves around the ques-
tion of whether the Free Exercise Clause protects religious conduct as well
as religious beliefs."°3 The United States Supreme Court has made it abso-
lutely clear that the Constitution forbids laws which regulate religious be-
liefs."° The Court, however, has not interpreted the Constitution as giving
such absolute protection to religiously motivated conduct.' 5
A. Religious Beliefs: Absolute Protection
In 1878, the Supreme Court announced that the Free Exercise Clause pro-
hibits all governmental regulation of religious beliefs."° In Reynolds v.
United States, 10 7 the Court addressed whether, under the Free Exercise
Clause, a state law criminalizing polygamy could be applied to a Mormon
whose religious practice permitted having more than one wife.' 08 The Court
acknowledged that "while [laws] cannot interfere with mere religious belief
and opinions, they may with practices."'" Thus, the Supreme Court distin-
guished the protection of religious beliefs, believing in Mormon teachings,
from the protection of religious practices, having more than one wife. 110
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Waite concluded that the state law
proscribing polygamy did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because it did
101. Id. at 1483-84. The Free Exercise Clause, as we know it today, most resembles the
formulation proposed by Fisher Ames of Massachusetts: "'Congress shall make no law estab-
lishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience.'"
Id. at 1482 (quoting I ANNALS OF CONG. 796 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (proposal of Fisher Ames,
Aug. 20, 1789)).
102. Id. at 1488. Based on reference to dictionaries at the time of the framing of the Bill of
Rights, the term "exercise" strongly connoted actions, while the term "conscience" was
equated more with opinion or belief. Id. at 1489.
103. Compare Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding Free Exercise Clause
protects beliefs, not actions) with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding Free Exer-
cise Clause protects both beliefs and practices).
104. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
105. See generally, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
106. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
107. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
108. Id. at 161-66.
109. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
110. Id.
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not regulate a religious belief, but instead regulated a religious practice."'
From Reynolds, therefore, emerged a belief-action rule that prohibited gov-
ernmental regulation of religious beliefs, but permitted regulation of conduct
based on those beliefs."12
Although Reynolds is over a century old, the Court has continued to ad-
here to the idea that the Free Exercise Clause absolutely prohibits govern-
mental regulation of religious beliefs." 3 Thus, the government may not,
under the Free Exercise Clause, compel affirmation or rejection of certain
religious beliefs." 4 For example, in Torcaso v. Watkins," 5 the Court invali-
dated a Maryland constitutional provision requiring candidates for public
office to declare their belief in God. 1 6 The Court based its holding on the
First Amendment religion clauses in determining that "neither a State nor
the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion.' "117 Furthermore, in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,'" the Court held that the state could not
compel students to salute the flag when their religious beliefs forbade salut-
ing a flag." 9 The Court noted that the compulsory flag salute and pledge
required affirmation of a belief 120  that was contrary to the First
Amendment. '
2
111. Id. at 165.
112. Id. at 164. The Supreme Court was relying on Jefferson's theory of religious freedom
when it created the belief-action distinction. Id at 163-64.
113. The Court has frequently stated that the freedom to believe is absolute and that no
regulation of religious beliefs is permissible. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940), the Court stated "the [First] Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute .... " In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603
(1961), the Court stated "[c]ertain aspects of religious exercise cannot, in any way, be re-
stricted or burdened by either federal or state legislation. Compulsion by law of the accept-
ance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship is strictly forbidden. The freedom to
hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute."
114. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
115. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
116. Id at 496.
117. Id. at 495.
118. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
119. Id at 642, 633.
120. Id at 633.
121. The Court noted that the Constitution prevents officials from prescribing "what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion" and further, the
Constitution prevents government from forcing "citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein." Id at 642.
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B. Religious Acts: Less Protection
While the Court has always recognized that "[tihe door of the Free Exer-
cise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of reli-
gious beliefs,"'22 the Court has not given such broad protection to religious
conduct. For almost a century after Reynolds v. United States, 23 the Court
applied the Reynolds belief-action rule to resolve free exercise challenges. 1
24
The Court would invalidate state laws which targeted religious beliefs,' 25 but
not state laws which regulated religious conduct.' 26 Then, in Sherbert v.
Verner,127 the Court departed from its belief-action distinction.128 In fact,
the Sherbert Court rejected the belief-action distinction in favor of a strict
scrutiny standard of review.
129
In Sherbert, the South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied
Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, unemployment compensation because
she would not work on Saturdays. 3 0 Sherbert worked in a South Carolina
textile mill.' 3' When she originally started work at the mill she worked a
five-day week, so there was no conflict with her religion.' 3 2 Then, in 1959,
122. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
123. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
124. Reynolds was the first case holding that actions could be regulated in the service of a
state's secular goals. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (emphasis). Thus, despite the absolute protec-
tion of religious beliefs, Reynolds still left room for government regulation of religion; it just
had to be a regulation of a religious practice rather than a belief to be valid. For example, a
government policy could make the practice of a person's religion more expensive, difficult or
dangerous; but if such state action remained "on the action side of the belief-action dichot-
omy," the Reynolds rule would maintain such practices as constitutional. Ira C. Lupu, Where
Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV.
933, 938 (1989).
125. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
126. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding the state's child
labor statute which prohibited minors from selling newspapers and pamphlets even though
such activity was the religious practice of Jehovah's Witnesses); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145 (up-
holding the criminal law that prohibited polygamy, even though the Mormon faith dictated
that men must take more than one wife).
127. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Sherbert v. Verner is the "first and leading case in the Supreme
Court's modern free exercise jurisprudence." McConnell, supra note 9, at 1412.
128. Lupu, supra note 126, at 939.
129. In Sherbert, the Court acknowledged that it was an action and not a belief that was
being regulated; nevertheless, the Court did not uphold the governmental regulation. Sherbert,
374 U.S. at 404. If the Court had followed the Reynolds rule, it most likely would have upheld
the regulation because it was not a belief that was being regulated.
130. Id. at 399. The Seventh-Day Adventist Church prohibits Saturday labor because Sat-
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the work week was expanded to six days, including Saturdays. 133 Because
her religion forbade Saturday labor, Sherbert refused to work Saturdays, and
was fired. 134 When she sought unemployment compensation, the Employ-
ment Security Commission denied her application finding no "good cause"
for her refusal to work. 135 A provision of the South Carolina Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act rendered a claimant ineligible for unemployment
benefits if he failed, without good cause, to accept available suitable work. 
136
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the denial of benefits holding
that the statute did not "prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom
to observe her religious beliefs."'
137
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan reversed the South Carolina
Supreme Court. 13' Although the South Carolina Unemployment Compen-
sation Act was a generally applicable law enacted to achieve the secular ob-
jective of preserving the unemployment fund (and not to impinge upon
Sherbert's religious beliefs), the Court still found that the law violated Sher-
bert's free exercise of religion. 139 The statute forced Sherbert to choose be-
tween her religious practices and her unemployment benefits. 1"
Comparing the right of free exercise of religion with the right of free
speech under the First Amendment, 4 ' Justice Brennan invoked the strict
scrutiny standard of review. 142  Under the strict scrutiny test, the Court
weighs the damage to individual religious freedom against the harm to the
state's legislative scheme. 143 The state must justify any law which burdens
religious liberty, even if only indirectly, by a compelling state interest. 144 In
133. Id.
134. Id. at 399. After she was fired, she did attempt to get work in other mills but was
unable to find five-day work.
135. Id. at 401.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 303-04, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746 (1962)).
138. Id. at 410.
139. Id. at 406. Justice Brennan acknowledged that no criminal sanctions directly com-
pelled Sherbert to work on Saturdays; however, he recognized that a law could violate the Free
Exercise Clause even if the burden on religion is only indirect. Id. at 404.
140. Id.
141. According to Justice Brennan, conditioning the availability of benefits upon Sherbert's
willingness to violate her religious beliefs was comparable to penalizing those individuals who
exercise their right to engage in certain forms of speech. Id. at 406.
142. The Sherbert decision represents the first time the Court affirmed its duty to weigh an
individual's claim for religious liberty against the harm to the state's legislative scheme. J.
Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 329 (1969).
Also, the Sherbert decision highlights that the Court no longer recognizes a belief-action dis-
tinction. Id. Sherbert involved an action, not a belief, but the Court still afforded protection to
the plaintiff. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
143. Clark, supra note 142, at 329.
144. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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addition, the state must show that the law is the least restrictive means of
achieving its compelling state goal. 45 If the state fails to satisfy this burden,
it will lose and the Court may exempt the individual from compliance with
the law. " This was the result in Sherbert. The Court found that the
State's interest in safeguarding the unemployment compensation fund'47 was
not compelling and overturned the South Carolina Supreme Court's
decision.
148
III. THE POST SHERBERT V. VERNER BALANCING TEST
Commentators consider Sherbert v. Verner 49 a landmark case in the free
exercise arena because it is the first case in which the Supreme Court
adopted the compelling state interest test as the standard of review in free
exercise cases.' 50 Since Sherbert, the Court has applied this test, albeit in
various forms, in most of its free exercise cases. The Court has invoked the
test both to grant and deny exemptions from neutral, secular laws.
A. Religious Exemptions Granted
The Supreme Court has consistently applied the Sherbert compelling state
interest test to grant individuals exemptions from unemployment compensa-
tion laws. Both in 1981 and in 1987, the Supreme Court exempted individu-
als from unemployment compensation laws which contained provisions
similar to the South Carolina statute in Sherbert.'51
In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Divi-
sion,'5 2 Thomas terminated his employment when he was transferred within
his company to a department which produced turrets for military tanks." 3
His religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness prevented him from participating
in the production of war materials. 154 The Employment Security Division
denied him unemployment compensation benefits because it found that
145. Thomas v Review Bd. of the Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
There must be no alternative forms of regulation that would accomplish the state's purpose
without infringing First Amendment rights. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
146. Id. at 408-09.
147. The State argued that its interest was to safeguard the unemployment compensation
fund against individuals who would file fraudulent claims based on feigned religious objections.
Id. at 405-07.
148. Id. at 407- 10.
149. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
150. Supra note 127 and accompanying text.
151. See Hobbie v. Unempl. Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review
Bd. of the Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
152. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
153. Id. at 709.
154. Id.
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Thomas's decision to quit work was not based upon a " 'good cause [arising]
in connection with [his] work'" as required by the unemployment compen-
sation statute."' 5 Using the Sherbert test, the Supreme Court found that the
statute burdened Thomas's free exercise of religion.156 The statute denied
Thomas benefits solely on the basis of his religious practices. It forced him
to choose between quitting work or violating his religious beliefs.'- 7 The
Supreme Court held that the State failed to meet its burden of showing that
the statute was the "least restrictive means of achieving some compelling
state interest.' 5 8 As in Sherbert, the state interest in preserving the integ-
rity of the unemployment compensation fund was not sufficiently compelling
to justify the burden on Thomas's religious practices.' 59
Six years later, in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,' 6° the
Supreme Court again granted a religious exemption from an unemployment
compensation statute.16 1 In this case, Hobbie was employed at a jewelry
store where she worked Friday nights and Saturdays. 62 She was subse-
quently baptized into the Seventh-Day Adventist church which forbids work
from Friday night through Saturday. 63 Her employer informed her that
she would either have to work Friday nights and Saturdays or resign.'6
When she refused to resign, her employer fired her.'6 5 Because her refusal
to work was "misconduct connected with [her] work" the Bureau of Unem-
ployment Compensation denied her benefits.' 66  On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court subjected the Florida statute to the Sherbert compel-
ling state interest test and invalidated the "misconduct" provision as applied
to Hobbie.1
67
155. Id at 712.
156. "Where the state... denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious
belief,.. . a burden upon religion exists." Id. at 717-18.
157. Id. at 717.
158. Id at 718.
159. Id
160. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
161. Id. at 146.




166. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 443.101(l)(a) (1985)). The Florida unemployment stat-
ute only authorized benefits to those individuals who became "unemployed through no fault of
their own" and not to those who were discharged for misconduct connected with their work.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 443.021). In this case the Bureau of Unemployment Compensa-
tion found that the claimant's refusal to work her scheduled shift was misconduct. Id. at 138-
39.
167. Id. at 141.
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In addition to applying the compelling state interest test to grant exemp-
tions from unemployment compensation laws, the Court has also invoked
the test to grant an exemption from a criminal law.' 68 The Supreme Court
has long recognized that a law which has the effect of criminalizing an indi-
vidual's religious conduct burdens that individual's free exercise of reli-
gion.' 6 9 It forces him to make the choice of either forsaking his religious
practice or facing criminal prosecution.' 7" For example, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 7' the Yoder parents were convicted of violating a Wisconsin com-
pulsory school attendance law requiring children to attend school until the
age of sixteen. ' 72 The law imposed sanctions on parents of children who did
not meet these attendance requirements. 73 The Yoders were members of
the Old Order Amish religion and believed that sending their children to
high school violated their faith. ' 74 Because the compulsory school law bur-
dened the free exercise of the Amish religion, the Court invoked strict scru-
tiny and looked to see if the State's interest was of "sufficient magnitude" to
override the Yoders' free exercise interest.17 5 Even though the State's inter-
est in education was strong, the Court determined that it was not sufficiently
compelling to override the Yoders' religious practices.' 76 The Court found
the Amish alternative method of education just as effective in accomplishing
the State's goals of preparing its citizens to be self-reliant and self-sufficient
168. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
169. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).
170. In Braunfeld, the Court distinguished criminal laws which force individuals to choose
between forsaking their religious beliefs and criminal prosecution from other criminal laws
which impose indirect burdens not amounting to such an extreme choice. Id. at 607. In
Braunfeld, a Pennsylvania law made it a crime to sell certain personal property on Sundays.
Id. at 600. A group of Jewish Orthodox merchants, who observed a Saturday Sabbath, chal-
lenged the law under the Free Exercise Clause claiming their non-sabbatarian competitors
would have a competitive, economic advantage in being able to sell merchandize six days a
week. Id. at 601. In rejecting the challenge, the Supreme Court deemed such burdens insuffi-
cient to justify an exemption from the law and stated that "the Sunday law simply regulates a
secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their
religious beliefs more expensive." Id. at 605. The merchants were not faced with such a seri-
ous choice as "forsaking their religious practices or subjecting themselves to criminal prosecu-
tion." Id. They could retain their current occupation and their religious practices with the
only result being an economic disadvantage. Id. at 606. Further, the Court noted that the
Sunday laws were the best means of advancing the state's secular goals of providing a general
day of rest. Id. at 608.
171. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
172. Id. at 207.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 209.
175. Id. at 214.
176. Id. at 221.
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in society. 77 Thus, the Court exempted the Yoders' from the State's com-
pulsory education law. 7
B. Exemptions Denied
In addition to granting exemptions by use of the Sherbert test, the Court
has also used the test to deny exemptions. In Gillette v. United States,179 a
consolidation of two cases, petitioners claimed exemptions from military ser-
vice during the Vietnam War based on their religious beliefs. 8 ° The first
petitioner, Gillette, claimed exemption from induction into the military ser-
vice based on conscientious objector grounds.' He believed the war was
"unjust" and that he had a duty to abstain from any participation in the war
based on his "'humanist approach to religion.' '182 The second petitioner,
Negre, had completed basic training and received orders to go to Vietnam
when he claimed he should be discharged as a conscientious objector.'
8 3
Negre believed it was his duty as a devout Catholic to distinguish just wars
from unjust wars. 18 4 He did not oppose all wars, only "unjust" wars such as
the Vietnam War.'
The free exercise claims of both Gillette and Negre stemmed from the
Military Selective Service Act (MSSA).18 6 The MSSA was a neutral, secular
law which authorized the granting of religious exemptions to conscientious
objectors.'8 7 In determining whether to grant Gillette an exemption from
conscription and Negre a discharge from the Army, however, the Court ap-
plied the Sherbert balancing test.' 8 Although it acknowledged that the
MSSA did burden the First Amendment values of Gillette and Negre, the
177. Id.
178. Id. at 236.
179. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
180. Id. at 448.
181. Id at 439.
182. Id His decision to not participate in military service stemmed from his deeply held
views concerning the purpose of human existence. Id.
183. Id at 440.
184. Id. at 441.
185. Id. at 440.
186. Id at 441. The Military Selective Service Act provides: "Nothing contained in this
title . . . shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and
service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief,
is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j)
(1988).
187. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 454. According to the Court, however, the MSSA did not require
exemptions for those conscientious objectors opposed to unjust wars, but only for those op-
posed to war in any form. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 462.
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Court found that such burden was justified. 1 9 The government's strong in-
terests in obtaining manpower for the national defense and maintaining a
fair draft system outweighed the burdens imposed on the petitioners. " The
Court held that the state's refusal to give Negre a discharge from the Army
and to grant Gillette an exemption from the conscription laws was "strictly
justified" in light of the government's substantial interests.' 9' As a result,
neither Gillette nor Negre prevailed on their free exercise claims. 192
In United States v. Lee,' 93 the Court again applied the Sherbert balancing
test to deny a religious exemption. The issue in this case was whether impos-
ing social security taxes on persons who have religious objections to either
paying or receiving public insurance benefits violates their free exercise
rights.' 9 4 Lee was an Amish farmer and carpenter who employed several
other Amish. Based on his religious beliefs,'" he refused to file social secur-
ity tax returns, withhold social security taxes from his employees, or pay the
employer's share of social security taxes.' 96 On review the Court applied the
Sherbert balancing test, arguing that because "[n]ot all burdens on religion
are unconstitutional" the State could restrict religious freedom if it could
show that such a restriction was "essential to accomplish an overriding gov-
ernmental interest."' 97 The Court then determined that the government's
interest in providing a comprehensive social security system justified its re-
fusal to exempt Lee from mandatory participation in the Social Security
program. 1
98
As recently as 1989, the Court reaffirmed the use of the Sherbert test as its
free exercise doctrine. 199 In Hernandez v. Commissioner,2 "0 Hernandez and
other members of the Church of Scientology paid money to the Church in
order to participate in a process known as "auditing."' According to the
Scientologists, this process enabled a person to become better aware of his
189. Id The conscription laws did not directly target the religious beliefs of the petition-
ers, but only incidentally affected their religious values. As a result, so long as there was a
substantial government interest to justify the burden, the Court held that a claim for an ex-
emption would be denied. Id.
190. Id
191. Id
192. Id at 439.
193. 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
194. Id. at 256.
195. Id. at 255. The Amish believe it to be a sin not to provide for their own needy and
elderly. Id.
196. Id at 254.
197. Id at 257-58
198. Id. at 258-61.
199. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
200. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
201. Id. at 684-85
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spiritual being.20 2 Hernandez and the other Scientologists sought to deduct
the "auditing" expenses from their federal income taxes as a religious ex-
pense.2"3 The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service denied a de-
duction for such "auditing" expenses 2' and rejected the argument that the
disallowance of the deduction violated their free exercise right because it
placed a heavy burden on their religious practice of "auditing."'2 5 In resolv-
ing the issue, the Court again relied on the compelling state interest test.2° 6
The Court, on appeal, expressed doubts as to whether the burden imposed
upon the Scientologists was in fact a, substantial one.20 7 The Scientologist
religion itself does not forbid the payment of taxes in connection with audit-
ing. Accordingly, the Court noted that the only burden on the Scientologists
resulted from the fact that they would have less money available to pay for
auditing sessions if forced to pay taxes.20" But even assuming that taxes
were a substantial burden on the Church of Scientology, the Court acknowl-
edged that the burden would be justified by -the compelling interest in main-
taining a sound tax system.
20 9
IV. THE COURT CARVES OUT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SHERBERT
BALANCING TEST
While the Court has promoted strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard
of review in free exercise cases, the Court has carved out some exceptions to
this standard. One exception includes cases involving military or prison reg-
ulations. When either military laws or prison regulations burden an individ-
ual's free exercise right, the Court has avoided applying the Sherbert v.
Verner2 1 ° strict scrutiny standard of review and instead has applied a "rea-
sonableness" standard of review.2 1' The "reasonableness" test is less restric-
202. Id at 684.
203. Id. at 686. The Scientologists attempted to claim the deduction as a "charitable con-
tribution" under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. Id
204. Id. at 686.
205. Id at 687-89. Both the Tax Court as well as the United States Courts of Appeals for
the First and Ninth Circuits affirmed the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service's
decision. Id
206. Id at 699 ("[Whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation
of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest
justifies the burden.").
207. Id
208. Id. The Court then emphasized that such a burden was no different from that im-
posed by any public tax.
209. Id
210. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
211. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S 342, 349 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
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tive than strict scrutiny.212 Under strict scrutiny, the state regulation has to
be strictly justified by a compelling state interest; whereas under the "reason-
ableness" test, the state regulation only has to be reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest.2 13 A high degree of judicial deference is therefore
accorded to the state under the "reasonableness" test.
2 4
In O'Lone v. Shabazz,21 5 Islamic prisoners challenged regulations adopted
by prison officials which prevented them from attending Jumu'ah, a weekly
Muslim congregational service. 216 The Islamic prisoners claimed that the
prison regulations violated their free exercise right under the First Amend-
ment.21 7 In reviewing the prisoners's free exercise claim, the Supreme Court
held that where prison regulations are involved, strict scrutiny is not the
appropriate standard of review;"' instead, a reasonableness standard is ap-
propriate.219 Under the reasonableness standard, a prison regulation is valid
even if it impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights, as long as the regula-
tion is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 220 The Court
found that the prison officials's objective of preventing security risks and
reducing administrative burdens clearly met the reasonableness standard
and upheld the regulation.
22 1
212. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349.
213. Id.
214. See id.; Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
215. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
216. Id. at 346-47. Inmates at a prison in Leesburg, New Jersey, were placed in one of
three custody classifications: maximum security, gang minimum security, or full minimum
security. In 1983, however, the New Jersey Department of Corrections issued Standard 853, a
regulation that required inmates to spend some time in a gang minimum status before they
could move to a full minimum security status. Id. at 345. Due to overcrowding, those placed
in gang minimum security or full minimum security were assigned to work jobs outside the
main building, and were supervised by only one guard. Id. at 346. Because of the security
risks and administrative burdens associated with allowing prisoners to return to the main
building during the day, prison officials prohibited inmates from returning to the prison during
the day unless an emergency existed. Id. at 347. As a result, those Islamic prisoners assigned
to work details outside the gates were forbidden to return to the main building to attend
Jumu'ah. Id.
217. Id
218. Id. at 349.
219. According to the Court, the penological objectives of deterring crime, rehabilitating
prisoners, and ensuring institutional security all justified the adoption of a more deferential
standard of review. Id. In rejecting strict scrutiny in favor of a reasonableness standard, the
Court emphasized that " '[Il]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limi-
tation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system.'" Id. at 348 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
220. Id. at 349.
221. Id. at 353. Security risks and administrative burdens would increase if the prisoners
were brought back to attend their service because there was only one outside-work prison
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The Court has also invoked the "reasonableness" standard when military
regulations are involved.222 In Goldman v. Weinberger,22 3 an Air Force reg-
ulation prohibited Air Force personnel from wearing headgear while in-
doors. 224 Goldman was an orthodox Jew and an ordained Rabbi who
accepted a scholarship and stipend from the Air Force to attend school to
become a psychologist.225 Upon completing school, he served as a clinical
psychologist for the Air Force.226 In adherence to his Jewish faith,
Goldman wore his yarmulke indoors even after his commander repeatedly
told him he was violating the regulation that prohibited indoor headgear.227
After receiving a formal letter of reprimand and being threatened with a
court-martial, Goldman sued Secretary of Defense Weinberger, claiming the
Air Force regulation infringed upon his free exercise rights.
22
1
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted
Goldman's request for an injunction and permanently enjoined the Air
Force from prohibiting Goldman from wearing his yarmulke.229 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, reversed the Dis-
trict Court.230 It held that review of military regulations should focus on
whether" 'legitimate military ends are sought to be achieved' " and whether
the regulation is "'designed to accommodate the individual right to an ap-
propriate degree.' ,231
In reviewing Goldman's free exercise claim, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals.2 32 Justice Rehnquist emphasized the unique nature of
the military mission as justification for the Court's great deference to the
military authorities.233 He stated that "'within the military community
there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as there is in the larger
civilian community.' ,,234 According to the Court, the challenged regulation
guard. If he had to bring one prisoner back, he would have to bring all the prisoners back. Id.
at 346.
222. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
223. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
224. Id. at 505.
225. Id. at 504.
226. Id. at 505.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 505-06.
229. Id. at 506.
230. Id.
231. Id. (quoting Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
232. Id. at 510.
233. Id. at 507.
234. Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974) (alteration in original)).
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was reasonably related to the military need to instill upon its members the
necessary habits of discipline and unity. 2"
Another exception to the Sherbert test involves cases in which governmen-
tal programs or regulations burden an individual's religious practice but do
not coerce or compel an individual to engage in conduct proscribed by his
religion. The cases of Bowen v. Roy2 36 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Association 2 37 illustrate this exception. In Bowen, the peti-
tioners were members of the Native American Church and believed that
obtaining a social security number for their daughter violated their religious
beliefs.2 38 While seeking public benefits, they discovered that the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and the Food Stamp
Program would not give them benefits until they provided the social security
number of each member of their household.2 39 Because the Roys failed to
provide their daughter's social security number, the Department of Health
and Human Services terminated the AFDC and medical benefits paid on
behalf of the child.2'
In determining the validity of the First Amendment free exercise claim,
Chief Justice Burger refused to apply the compelling state interest test ad-
vanced in Sherbert and Wisconsin v. Yoder.24" ' Instead, Chief Justice Burger
announced that the government meets its burden when it shows that its stat-
utory requirements are a "reasonable" method of promoting legitimate pub-
lic interests. 242 The Court found that the requirement for a social security
number did promote a legitimate state interest (the prevention of fraud), and
therefore the Court refused to exempt the Roys from the statutory
requirement.
213
235. Id. at 510.
236. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
237. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
238. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 695.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
242. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708. Even though Chief Justice Burger was joined by the majority
of the Court in his judgment, the Court was divided with respect to the standard of review to
be used. Only Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined with Chief Justice Burger with respect to
the standard of review to be used. Justice Stevens believed that the issue was either moot or
not ripe and did not advocate a position with regard to the standard of review to be used. Id.
at 722. Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, and White disagreed with use of
the rational basis test and stated that the "compelling state interest" tests of Sherbert, Thomas,
and Yoder should have governed the case. Id. at 715, 728, 732.
243. Id. at 709. In the case of Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987), the Court specifically rejected Chief Justice Burger's Bowen argument that the stan-
dard of review for free exercise claims should be whether the challenged requirement is a
"reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest." Id. at 141. Instead of following
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Chief Justice Burger justified the Court's departure from the compelling
state interest test by distinguishing Bowen from Sherbert.2" The petitioner
in Bowen objected to the social security number requirement because he be-
lieved the use of the number would harm his daughter's spirit, not because it
restricted his own religious beliefs or practices.24 According to Chief Jus-
tice Burger, the Free Exercise Clause has never required the government to
conduct its operations in accordance with the religious beliefs of individual
citizens.2 46 In fact, "[tihe Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protec-
tion from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an
individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal
procedures. 
2 4 7
The Court's rationale in Bowen was later extended in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetary Protective Association. 24 In Lyng, the Forest Service
planned to build a six mile paved road on federal property, linking two Cali-
fornia towns. 24 9 The Northwest California Indians, claiming the area con-
cerned was sacred to them,2 5° challenged the government's plan as a
violation of their free exercise rights.25 ' In an analysis similar to that in
Bowen, the Court distinguished governmental programs which do not have a
tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religion from
those which force individuals to act in a way which violates their religion.
252
Finding Lyng in the former category, the Court held that no burden on reli-
Chief Justice Burger's reasoning, the Court reiterated Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
in Bowen: " 'Such a test has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment
value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already pro-
vides.'" Id. at 141-42.
244. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699-700.
245. Id. at 699. The Court found that there was no legally cognizable burden imposed on
Roy's religion. The requirement that a social security number be assigned to Roy's daughter
in no way impairs Roy's "'freedom to believe, express, and exercise'" his religion. Id. at 700
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1966 (1978)).
246. Id. at 699.
247. Id at 700 (emphasis added). "Just as the Government may not insist that [the Roys]
engage in any set form of religious observance, so [the Roys] may not demand that the Gov-
ernment join in their chosen religious practices by refraining from using a number to identify
their daughter." Id at 699-700.
248. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
249. Id. at 442.
250. Id. The area involved had historically been used by the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa
Indians for religious purposes. Id A study by the Forest Service of American Indian religious
sites found that the area was "'significant as an integral and indispensible part of Indian reli-
gious conceptualization and practice.'" Id. The area was used for certain religious rituals and
"'successful use of the [area] [was] dependent upon and facilitated by certain qualities of the
physical environment, the most important of which are privacy, silence, and an undisturbed
natural setting.'" Id. (footnote omitted).
251. Id. at 443.
252. Id. at 450-51.
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gion existed and, therefore, the compelling state interest test did not
apply.
253
Based on the previous cases which delineated several exceptions to the
Sherbert test, it may appear that the free exercise doctrine is in disarray,
254
however, a closer analysis reveals that there is a specific approach to free
exercise claims. With certain recognized exceptions, the Court has consist-
ently applied the Sherbert strict standard of review to free exercise cases.
The Court will depart from the Sherbert framework only when prison or
military regulations are involved or when the government action affects, but
does not coerce, individuals into adhering to or abstaining from certain reli-
gious practices.255 Outside of these exceptions, however, the Court has con-
sistently applied the Sherbert test to either grant or deny religious
exemptions;256 at least that was true until the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.2 57
V. SMITH ABANDONS SHERBERT
In Smith, a private drug rehabilitation organization fired two of its em-
ployees, Smith and Black, because they had illegally ingested peyote during a
religious ceremony of the Native American Church. 25 ' Following their dis-
charge, Smith and Black applied for unemployment compensation. 259 The
Employment Division rejected their claim for benefits, however, because
253. Id.
254. A number of commentators have begun to question whether the Court actually
utilizes the Sherbert strict scrutiny test in its free exercise cases because of the Court's frequent
denial of exemptions. Marshall, supra note 5, at 369. Further, one commentator has sug-
gested that the court has substantially returned to its pre-Sherbert approach. Id.
255. And even in those cases where government actions affect but do not coerce individuals
into adhering to religious practices, the Court was divided on what standard of review to
apply, ie., reasonableness standard or strict scrutiny. See supra notes 242-43.
256. In its early post-Sherbert cases the Court was quick to vindicate free exercise claims
using the Sherbert test, either through invalidating the state regulation or through granting
exemptions to individuals. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). More recently,
however, the Court has used the balancing test, but has been reluctant to uphold the free
exercise claim unless it involved unemployment compensation programs similar to that in
Sherbert. Compare Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) and
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (invalidating un-
employment laws for impinging on individual's free exercise claims) with Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) and Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (denying exemption from laws of general applicability
even though they impinge upon individual's free exercise of religion).
257. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
258. Id. at 1597.
259. Id. at 1598.
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they had been discharged for work-related "misconduct." 2" Thereafter,
Smith and Black challenged the Employment Division's determination by
arguing that the denial of unemployment compensation benefits violated
their rights of free exercise of religion.26 Claiming that the sacramental
ingestion of peyote was their religious practice, Smith and Black argued the
denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause.262 The Oregon Supreme
Court agreed.26 a Relying on Supreme Court holdings in Thomas v. Review
Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division and Sherbert v. Verner,
the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the State of Oregon could not
deny unemployment benefits to Smith and Black because they ingested pe-
yote during their religious ceremony.2"
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia,265 reversed
the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court.266 The majority refused to read
the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause so broadly as to exempt indi-
viduals from broad-based criminal laws due to religious reasons. 267 The ma-
jority argued that the First Amendment absolutely protects an individual
against state regulations which directly target religion, but that the Free Ex-
ercise Clause does not relieve an individual from complying with a neutral,
generally applicable, criminal law due to his religious convictions.26 Ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, the Free Exercise Clause protects individuals
against laws which interfere with religious beliefs, but not against valid, neu-
269aiaano-tral laws which only affect religious practices. Justice Scalia acknowl
edged the existence of previous cases whereby the Court held that the First
Amendment barred "application of a neutral, generally applicable law to
religiously motivated action., 270 He distinguished these cases, however, by
arguing that they were "hybrid" cases which involved something more than
just the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion. 27' These hybrid
cases involved the Free Exercise Clause combined with other constitutional
260. Id. Under Oregon unemployment compensation laws, a person was disqualified from





265. Id. at 1597. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Renhquist and Justices White,
Stevens, and Kennedy. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment only, and Justices Mar-
shall, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented.
266. Id. at 1606.
267. Id. at 1599.
268. Id. at 1600.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1601.
271. Id. at 1601-02.
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protections.272 Because Smith involved a free exercise claim unconnected to
any other constitutional guarantee, it was not a hybrid case.2173 The
Supreme Court, therefore, held that Smith and Black should not be exempt
from the application of the neutral, generally applicable law, even in view of
their religious tenets.
2 74
The Supreme Court also used the Smith case to abandon the compelling
state interest test as the standard of review in free exercise claims involving
"across-the-board" criminal prohibitions.21 5  Justice Scalia acknowledged
the validity of such a test only in special cases where the state has set forth a
system of individualized assessments, such as the unemployment compensa-
tion cases, 27 6 or when the state has passed a law directly regulating religious
beliefs.1
77
In justifying the majority's position, Justice Scalia focused on the impact
of the compelling state interest test. He noted that the compelling interest
test is a familiar one from other constitutional fields and he recognized the
272. Justice Scalia provided examples of "hybrid" cases. Id. at 1601. He indicated that
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1990), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
were hybrid cases. Cantwell involved freedom of speech and press as well as free exercise
claims. Yoder involved the privacy right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children,
as well as the free exercise claim. Id. at 1601 n. 1. Justice Scalia indicated that the only reason
the religious claims in these cases were upheld was because of the hybrid nature of the case.
Justice Scalia hints that it is the free speech or privacy aspect of the case that would uphold the
religious exemption claim, and not the mere fact that the individual's right to practice religion
was burdened. Id. at 1601.
273. Id. at 1602.
274. Id. at 1606. "[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obliga-
tion to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'" Id. at 1600
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
275. Id. at 1603. While the Smith case itself involves a criminal law of general applicabil-
ity, lower courts have extended Smith to free exercise cases involving any neutral laws of
general applicability, regardless of whether they are civil or criminal laws. See Vandiver v.
Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding student not exempt from a
Kentucky school equivalency testing regulation under the Free Exercise Clause alone); Salva-
tion Army v. Dep't of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a family
center for disadvantaged persons was not exempt from state civil statute regulating boarding
houses); Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of
New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding church was not exempt from city's
Landmarks Preservation Law); Intercommunity Ctr. for Justice and Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42
(2d Cir. 1990) (finding religious organization was not exempt from compliance with Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act).
276. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603. Justice Scalia noted that the unemployment compensation
cases provide eligibility criteria which have to be applied to each claimant. Under the unem-
ployment statutes, the claimant had to have "good cause" to quit work or to refuse available
work. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, there were statutory standards to determine whether
or not to grant claimants individual religious exemptions. Id.
277. Id.
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validity of the test in those other constitutional fields.27 In the free exercise
arena, however, Justice Scalia declared that the test is not valid.279 If the
test were applied in the free exercise arena in the same manner as it has been
traditionally used in other constitutional fields, few of the laws would meet
the test.280 Under the traditional use of the compelling state interest test,
laws are deemed "presumptively invalid" if they do not protect an interest of
the highest order.2"' Justice Scalia argued that invoking such a test in the
free exercise arena would force the Court to grant religious exemptions from
regulatory laws of all kinds, including health and safety regulations, child
neglect laws, traffic laws, child labor laws, and other kinds of social welfare
legislation.28 2 Since the Free Exercise Clause does not require such a re-
sult,28 3 Justice Scalia would abandon the test in cases involving generally
applicable criminal laws. 28 4 Instead of the compelling interest test, Justice
Scalia suggested that legislative intervention is a sufficient, alternative
method of protecting the free exercise of religion. 2 5
A. Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, 286 rejected the majority's
rationale.28 7 Justice O'Connor stressed that the Free Exercise Clause does
not distinguish between those laws which are generally applicable and laws
which target particular religious conduct. 288 In fact, she claimed that for the
most part the free exercise cases before the Court have almost always in-
volved laws of general applicability which have had only the incidental effect
278. Id. at 1604.
279. Id. Justice Scalia acknowledged the validity of the "compelling governmental inter-
est" test in free speech and also in equal protection cases concerning suspect classes, such as
race, but hints that using it in the free exercise arena would diminish it significantly. He
stated: "What [the compelling state interest test] produces in those other fields--equality of
treatment, and an unrestricted flow of contending speech-are constitutional norms; what it
would produce here-a private right to ignore generally applicable laws-is a constitutional
anomaly." Id.
280. I. at 1605.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1606.
284. Id. at 1603.
285. Id. Justice Scalia proposed that the legislature could enact laws which would accom-
modate specific individual religious practices. In fact, legislative intervention has already re-
solved the question at hand in many states. In Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico, the
legislatures have already made an exception to the drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote.
Id. at 1606.
286. Both Justices Marshall and Brennan concurred with Justice O'Connor in her ration-
ale, but not in the Court's judgment. Id.
287. Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
288. Id at 1608.
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of burdening a religious practice.2' 9 As far as Justice O'Connor is con-
cerned, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment clearly protects
individuals against criminal regulations of general applicability (such as the
Oregon statute at issue) which have the incidental effect of burdening reli-
gious conduct. 2" The protection, however, is not absolute.2 91 In accord-
ance with modern free exercise doctrine, Justice O'Connor emphasized that
the standard is whether or not the government can justify a substantial bur-
den on religion by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that interest.292 She explicitly rejected Justice Scalia's
argument that the accommodation of religious practices should be left to the
political process.29 a
While disagreeing with the majority's rationale, however, Justice
O'Connor does concur in the Court's judgment.294 Applying the compel-
ling state interest test, she found that the Employment Division should deny
benefits to the claimants because of their illegal use of peyote.295 Justice
O'Connor recognized that the government's interest in preventing both the
289. "Indeed, few States would be so naive as to enact a law directly prohibiting or burden-
ing a religious practice as such." Id.
290. In support of her position, Justice O'Connor recalls the decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder
where the Court expressly rejected Justice Scalia's interpretation of the scope of the First
Amendment:
[O]ur decisions have rejected the idea that religiously grounded conduct is always
outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that activities of individ-
uals, even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States ....
But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad
police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the
State to control, even under regulations of general applicability ....
Id at 1609 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972)) (emphasis in original).
291. Id. at 1608.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1613. According to Justice O'Connor, the First Amendment, as part of the Bill
of Rights, was enacted specifically to protect the religious practice of the minority population.
The political process is already able to protect the majority view.
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicis-
situdes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they de-
pend on the outcome of no elections.
Id. (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
294. Id. at 1615.
.295. Id. at 1614. Justice O'Connor finds that the governmental interest in preventing the
physical harm that could be caused by using drugs is compelling enough to justify the burden
on the claimants. Furthermore, she would not allow an exemption for the claimants because
uniform application of the Oregon criminal prohibition is essential to accomplish its overriding
interest. Id.
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use and trafficking of controlled substances outweighs the legitimate free ex-
ercise claim of Smith and Black.
B. The Dissent
Justice Blackmun,2 96 writing for the dissent, also rejected the approach
used by Justice Scalia.29 Justice Blackmun would continue to adhere to the
"consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a state stat-
ute that burdens the free exercise of religion."2 9 That is, the statute should
only be allowed to stand if the state can justify both the law and the state's
refusal to grant an exemption from the law by a compelling state interest.
299
Upon application of the compelling state interest test, however, Justice
Blackmun reached a different result than Justice O'Connor. a°° Justice
Blackmun found no evidence that an exemption for religious users of peyote
would harm the state's interest in protecting the health and safety of its citi-
zens. 30 1 Further, he rejected the government's argument that an exception
for peyote would hinder the government's interest in abolishing drug traf-
ficking 30 2 and he dismissed the notion that this exception would promote a
"flood of other religious claims" as mere speculation. 30 3 Thus, he would
grant a religious exemption to the claimants from the application of the Ore-




VI. THE AFTERMATH OF SMITH
In Smith, Justice Scalia argued that the First Amendment does not pro-
tect religious practices from generally applicable laws which burden reli-
gious practices and suggested that free exercise should be confined to the
296. Id. at 1618. Justice Blackmun was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall. Justices O'Connor, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall all concurred that the compelling
state interest test should be the free exercise inquiry. Justice O'Connor, however, applied the
test to uphold the state prohibition of the sacramental use of peyote, while the other three
Justices applied the test and granted an exemption to the claimants for their religious conduct.
None of these four Justices agreed with Justice Scalia's rationale.
297. Id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 1615.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1617.
301. Id. at 1618. Justice Blackmun put great stock in the fact that other courts have found
that the religious use of peyote is not harmful to the health and welfare of those who engage in
the sacramental use of peyote. Id. Furthermore, he emphasized that the Native American
Church's internal restrictions on its members' use of peyote diminishes the state's health and
welfare concerns. Id.
302. Id. at 1620.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1621
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protection of beliefs and not practices. In doing so, Justice Scalia dismissed
free exercise precedent and completely disregarded the legislative history of
the Free Exercise Clause. Furthermore, by suggesting that it is the legisla-
ture's role and not the Court's role to resolve free exercise claims, the Smith
Court promoted the dissipation of minority religions and thus trivialized the
First Amendment right of free exercise of religion.
A. Distorting Free Exercise Precedent
Justice Scalia proclaimed that the First Amendment only protects an indi-
vidual's free exercise of religion against laws that specifically target religion,
and not against laws of general applicability."a 5 Such a theory distorts free
exercise precedent. In Yoder v. Wisconsin,3 "6 the compulsory school attend-
ance law did not specifically target the Amish religion, but instead was a
neutral, general law applicable to all citizens regardless of religion. a 7 Still,
the Court invoked the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to pro-
tect the Amish religious practice of taking their children out of school after
the eighth grade.3a 8 Also, when the Court denied religious exemptions to
the individual petitioners in Gillette, Lee, and Hernandez,"° the Court did
not justify its decisions in these cases on the grounds that the First Amend-
ment did not apply to laws of general applicability. As Justice O'Connor
emphasized in her concurrence in Smith, the Court, if anything, expressly
rejected the idea that the First Amendment does not apply to laws of general
applicability.310
The Smith Court's distortion of free exercise precedent is particularly ap-
parent from the Court's reliance on Minersville School District Board of Edu-
cation v. Gobitis3 1' and Reynolds v. United States.a" 2 Justice Scalia quoted
Gobitis to support the majority's broad conclusion that generally applicable
laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause,313 but he failed to acknowledge
305. Id. at 1599-1600.
306. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
307. Id. at 207-08 n.2.
308. Id.
309. Each of these cases involved laws of general applicability. See generally, Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
310. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor relied on
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20.
311. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (upholding the punishment of Jehovah's Witnesses for not saluting the flag
and pledging allegiance).
312. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
313. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600. Justice Scalia quoted Justice Frankfurter's statement in
Gobitis:
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that the Supreme Court overruled Gobitis in 1943. 314 Since Gobitis is no
longer good law, it cannot support Justice Scalia's assertion that the Court
has never excused an individual from compliance with generally applicable
laws based on religious beliefs.315
The Court's reliance on Reynolds is also misplaced. While Justice Scalia
accurately stated that the Court held in Reynolds that the First Amendment
protected beliefs but not practices,316 he never acknowledged that Sherbert
extended Reynolds.317 The Court in Sherbert abandoned the Reynolds be-
lief-action distinction and concluded that the First Amendment protects
against both laws which target religious beliefs and laws which have the inci-
dental effect of burdening religious practices.318
B. Disregarding Legislative History
The Smith decision not only distorts free exercise precedent, but it also
disregards the legislative history of the Free Exercise Clause when it rejects
the concept of religious exemptions from laws of general applicability.
319
Religious exemptions are clearly consistent with the Framers's intent.32°
In drafting the Free Exercise Clause, the Framers relied on state constitu-
tional free exercise provisions, which reflected public support for broad pro-
tection of religious liberty.321 State constitutions defined the scope of
religious liberty as encompassing both religious beliefs and actions 322 and
imposed very few limitations on the right of free exercise of religion.323 The
only time the state could intrude upon an individual's right of free exercise
was if the individual's religious practices disturbed the safety, peace, or good
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toler-
ation, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the pro-
motion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious
convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not
relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.
Id. (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594-95).
314. See Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (finding state's actions in compelling flag salute and the
pledge of allegiance violated the First Amendment).
315. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
316. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 124-29.
318. Id.
319. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
320. See generally McConnell, supra note 9 (concluding that the doctrine of religious ex-
emptions is consistent with the Framers's intent); see also supra note 90 and accompanying
text.
321. Most states provided for the protection of religious liberty in some manner. See supra
notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
322. Supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
323. Supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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order of the public.a24 The broad protection afforded religious liberty and
the very narrow limitations on the Free Exercise Clause indicate that the
doctrine of religious exemptions would most likely have been favored by the
Framers.325
C. The Redundant Free Exercise Clause
Justice Scalia rationalized the Court's holding in Smith by claiming that
the Free Exercise Clause, taken alone, has never provided protection against
generally applicable laws.326 Justice Scalia argued that the Free Exercise
Clause grants protection from generally applicable laws only in hybrid
cases. 327 If this were the case, the Free Exercise Clause would be a virtual
nullity.328 The Constitution explicitly provides a device for the protection of
rights of free exercise, namely, the Free Exercise Clause itself.329 Denying
claims for free exercise unless such claims implicate other constitutional pro-
visions would contradict the text of the Constitution.33° It would "turn the
free exercise clause into a textual redundancy." 331 The Framers intended no
such result. They knew that religious liberty was of primary importance to
the American people, independent of other constitutional rights.
3 32
D. Eliminating the Compelling Interest Test
The majority's elimination of the compelling interest test as the standard
of review in free exercise cases involving neutral, criminal laws of general
applicability is, in essence, an outright withdrawal of constitutional protec-
tion for minority religions. As a result of Smith, courts will only invoke the
Sherbert balancing test in those free exercise cases involving laws that di-
324. Id.
325. Supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
326. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601 (1990).
327. Id. Under the hybrid theory, Justice Scalia argued that the Free Exercise Clause,
taken alone, is not a sufficient basis to grant an individual a religious exemption from a gener-
ally applicable law. Id. at 1601-02. Instead, the claim must involve the Free Exercise Clause
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as the Free Speech Clause and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
328. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 199
(1990) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
329. The First Amendment explicitly provides that "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; .... U.S. CONST.
amend. I. This First Amendment guarantee is applicable to the states by incorporation into
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
330. Marshall, supra note 5, at 373.
331. Id.
332. Even before the Bill of Rights was included in the Constitution, the American people
gave great protection to religious liberty. The colonies themselves provided specific statutory
protection for religious liberty. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40:929
Abandoning the Compelling Interest Test
rectly target religious beliefs.33a Most legislatures, however, do not pass
laws which unlawfully target religious practices.3 34 Instead, they pass neu-
tral laws of general applicability or general criminal prohibitions.335  The
Court has long recognized that these neutral laws also impact upon reli-
gion. 33' After Smith, however, there is virtually no judicial protection
against these laws.337 Smith thus authorizes the government to prohibit in-
numerable religious practices so long as it uses generally applicable laws.
338
The Smith Court recognizes that elimination of the compelling interest
test is equal to a virtual withdrawal of all judicial protection against laws of
general applicability, neutral in language and intent.339 The Court defends
this result, however, by contending it is the role of the legislature, and not
the court, to accommodate religion. 4° Such contention, however, would
eradicate protection of minority religions and defeat the very purpose of the
Free Exercise Clause.
The Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees certain fundamental, indi-
vidual rights. If protection of such rights is left to the legislature, mi-
nority religions will be disadvantaged 341 because they lack political pow-
333. Empl. Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602-03 (1990).
334. Id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
335. Free exercise cases have all concerned generally applicable laws which significantly
burden religious practices. Id. at 1608.
336. Id. at 1612. As Justice O'Connor stated, "laws neutral toward religion can coerce a
person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively
as laws aimed at religion." Id.
337. The Smith Court actually gives government almost unlimited control over individual
religious conduct because it no longer requires the government to provide compelling justifica-
tion for generally applicable laws which burden religious conduct. Id. at 1603.
338. Government could actually punish traditional religious practices, such as the use of
sacramental wine, the sale or consumption of kosher food, and the ritual of circumcision.
Leading Cases, supra note 328, at 202.
339. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
340. Id.
341. In fact, as a result of Smith, minority religions have already been disadvantaged.
Lower courts, adhering to the Smith ruling, have refused to strictly scrutinize laws of general
applicability which impinge upon individual religion practices. See generally Yang v. Sturner,
750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990) (denying Hmong Immigrants, who believed autopsies were a
mutilation of the body, exemptions from a facially-neutral Rhode Island law which mandated
autopsies); Montgomery v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (denying
exemption from a Michigan statute calling for autopsy of persons dying violent deaths to a
Jewish plaintiff, even though autopsies are offensive to the tenets of Judaism). Religious mi-
norities have also been disadvantaged by administrative decisions made in reliance on Smith.
For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recently altered its
ruling regarding members of the Sikh religion. Ruth Marcus, Reins on Religious Freedom?;
Broad Coalition Protests Impact of High Court Ruling, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1991, at Al. For
more than fifteen years, members of the Sikh religion, who wore turbans, were exempted from
the federal regulation requiring construction workers to wear hard hats. After the Smith deci-
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er. 42 The Framers never intended such a result.14 The Framers believed
that religion was such an important substantive right that it should be be-
yond the reach of the legislature."
E. Free Exercise Dilemma
While the majority's approach to free exercise claims is wrought with
problems,34 5 the Court's modem free exercise doctrine, as defined by Sher-
bert, has its own difficulty: determining exactly what constitutes a "compel-
ling" interest. The Smith case is indicative of such a problem. Justice
O'Connor asserted that the government's interest in protecting its people
from harmful drug abuse and drug trafficking was sufficiently compelling to
justify the burden on religion;34 6 Justice Blackmun stated that such interests
were merely symbolic and not so compelling. 47 According to Justice Black-
mun, the state had neither a concrete interest in enforcing its drug laws
against religious users (it did not prosecute the petitioners) nor an interest in
protecting the health and safety of the people (no evidence was presented
that peyote use is harmful).3 4 ' Thus, although Justices O'Connor and
Blackmun invoked the Sherbert test, they each attained different results.
Despite the vagueness and subjectivity of the Sherbert balancing test, the
Smith Court should not have abandoned the test. Instead, the Court should
have developed specific guidelines, consistent with the Framers's intent, to
sion, however, OSHA rescinded its policy of excepting Sikh members from the regulation. See
id.
342. The majority can elect new representatives into office if they believe that their rights
are not adequately protected or if they think that their rights are being impinged upon by
governmental legislation. Minorities do not have such protection. See JOHN HART ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 78 (1980).
343. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
344. Prior to adoption of the Free Exercise Clause, Madison tried to argue that a "repre-
sentative government with checks and balances" would be sufficient to protect religious liber-
ties and that a particular constitutional guarantee was not needed. McConnell, supra note 9, at
1479. His argument, however, was rejected. People seemed to fear "not deliberate oppression,
but the unintended effects of legislation passed without regard to the religious scruples of small
minorities." Id. at 1480. Because people worried that lack of specific constitutional protection
would result in the worsening of the position of religious minorities, they urged adoption of the
Free Exercise Clause into the Bill of Rights. Id.; see also supra notes 95-102 and accompany-
ing text.
345. The majority's approach disregards free exercise precedent, neglects to take into ac-
count the Framers's intent, and results in the eradication of the protection of minority
religions.
346. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1614 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
347. Id. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
348. Id. Justice Blackmun put great stock in the fact that other states did not find sacra-
mental use of peyote to be "so dangerous as to preclude an exemption for religious use." Id.
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define when a state's interest is sufficiently compelling to override a free exer-
cise claim. For example, inherent in each of the early state constitutions was
the right of the government to protect public peace and safety.349 The Court
may thus rely on this acknowledged governmental right in defining when the
government's interest is a compelling interest.35 0
VII. CONCLUSION
The Constitution guarantees the right of free exercise of religion. Tradi-
tionally, protection of this right has been left to the Court. In 1963, some
seventy years after the Court determined that such a right included only the
freedom to believe, the Court extended the right to include the freedom to
practice religion. At the same time, the Court invoked strict scrutiny as its
standard of review in free exercise cases involving neutral laws that inciden-
tally burden religion. This standard of review was entirely consistent with
the Framers's intent as it gave broad protection to the free exercise of
religion.
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, how-
ever, the Court abandoned its role as the protector of religious freedom. The
Court, in re-interpreting free exercise precedent and disregarding the legisla-
tive history of the Free Exercise Clause, declared that the right of free exer-
cise does not include protection from generally applicable criminal laws and
that the compelling interest test is no longer the appropriate standard of
review in such cases. The Smith Court thus trivializes religious liberty. In-
stead of ensuring that free exercise receives the broad protection the Framers
intended, the Court relegated protection of religious freedom to the legisla-
ture. By so doing, the Court conditioned the availability of the guaranteed
right of free exercise. Only those religious groups with the ability to influ-
ence the legislature will gain religious liberty. Such a result was not intended
by the Framers of the Bill of Rights.
Kathleen P. Kelly
349. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1464; see also supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
350. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1464. For example, the Court may state that a compel-
ling interest exists whenever an individual's free exercise of religion disturbs the public peace
and threatens the public safety. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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